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"Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses 
yearning to breathe free . . . ."1 
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Introduction 
In 2006, a new type of illegal immigration legislation began appearing 
in cities across the nation.2  Growing anti-immigrant public sentiment had 
been putting increasing political pressure on local municipal governments 
to take action against illegal immigrants.3  That same year, city councils 
across the country began drafting ordinances that singled out illegal aliens.4  
Aside from being intentionally discriminatory, these ordinances have been 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See Robert Tanner, Illegal Immigration Now a Local Problem, TULSA WORLD, 
July 20, 2006, at A12, available at http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid= 
13&articleid=060720_Ne_A12_Illeg37342&archive=yes ("Tired of waiting on federal 
action, states and municipal governments have passed their own laws . . . most of which 
make life harder for undocumented workers and demand that employers, law enforcement 
officers and even landlords act as the front line.") (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 3. See Kristina M. Campbell, Local Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinances:  A 
Legal, Policy, and Litigation Analysis, 84 DENV. U.L. REV. 1041, 1041 (2007) ("During the 
summer of 2006, as the U.S. House failed to move forward to complete legislative action, 
frustrations by anti-immigrant activists led to a small number of cities and towns attempting 
to enact restrictions and prohibitions against illegal immigrants at the local level."). 
 4. See Oren Dorell, Towns Take Aim at Illegal Immigration, USA TODAY, Aug. 14, 
2006, at 3A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-08-14-towns-
immigration_x.htm (citing efforts of city councils in Hazleton, Allentown, Shenandoah, and 
Mount Pocono, Pennsylvania; Riverside, New Jersey; Gadsden, Alabama; Kennewick, 
Washington; Escondido, California; and Avon Park and Palm Bay, Florida, to pass 
ordinances targeted at illegal immigrants) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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challenged on constitutional grounds.5  In the summer of 2006, an anti-
immigrant ordinance was passed in Hazelton, Pennsylvania, and that was 
only the beginning.6  That year, several other similar ordinances were 
passed in cities across the nation.7  First, this Note will discuss the two 
primary catalysts of the general public’s negative sentiment toward illegal 
immigrants:  (1) economic concerns and (2) anxiety concerning increased 
criminal activity.8  Next, this Note will analyze the potential constitutional 
infirmities of the ordinances.9  After presenting a constitutional analysis, 
this Note will examine how courts will handle anti-immigrant legislation 
going forward.10  Finally, this Note will present alternative solutions to the 
problems that initially spawned these ordinances.11 
I.  Boiling Point:  Summer 2006 and Hazelton 
By the summer of 2006, the public’s negative sentiment toward illegal 
aliens had come to a head, and local governments were beginning to take 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 459 F. Supp. 2d 332, 338 (M.D. Pa. 2006) 
(finding that the factors weighed in favor of granting a temporary restraining order against 
an ordinance regulating the housing and employment of undocumented immigrants and 
enjoining its enforcement), aff’d, No. 07-3531, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18835, at *138, *153 
(3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2010).  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that Hazleton’s 
ordinances were preempted by the Federal Immigration Reform and Control Act.  Id. 
 6. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-16 (Oct. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Hazleton 
Ordinance 2006-16], available at http://www.clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chdocs/public/IM-
PA-0001-0007.pdf (making it illegal for landlords to lease to, and employers to hire, illegal 
immigrants) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice); Dorell, supra note 4 (describing the mobilization of city councils across the country 
to enact anti-immigrant ordinances following the passage of the Hazleton Ordinance). 
 7. See DATABASE OF RECENT LOCAL ORDINANCES ON IMMIGRATION, FAIR 
IMMIGRATION REFORM MOVEMENT (2007), www.ailadownloads.org/advo/FIRM-
LocalLegislationDatabase.doc [hereinafter LOCAL ORDINANCES DATABASE] (listing the anti-
immigrant ordinances passed in 2006 by municipalities and counties in Alabama, California, 
Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 8. See Hazleton Ordinance 2006-16, supra note 6, § 2A ("Illegal immigration leads to 
higher crime rates . . . [and] contributes to other burdens on public services, increasing their 
cost and diminishing their availability to lawful residents, and destroys our neighborhoods 
and diminishes our overall quality of life."); see also infra discussion Part I. 
 9. Infra discussion Part II.B. 
 10. Infra discussion Part III. 
 11. Infra discussion Part IV. 
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matters into their own hands.12  For example, the mayor of Hazelton, 
Pennsylvania publicly blamed many of the city’s criminal, economic, and 
social ills on illegal immigrants.13  He was quoted as stating:  "Illegal 
immigrants are destroying the city.  I don’t want them here, period."14  On 
July 13, 2006, the city council in Hazelton, Pennsylvania, led by its mayor, 
approved the "City of Hazelton Illegal Immigration Relief Act 
Ordinance."15  Despite the fact that this ordinance was tailored to regulate 
the employment and housing of illegal immigrants, the mayor’s statements 
made it clear that it was really an attempt to force illegal immigrants out of 
the city.16 
Although Hazelton was the first city in the United States to pass such 
discriminatory legislation, it cannot be blamed for the recent wave of anti-
immigrant public sentiment.17  A new attitude toward illegal immigrants 
took root in the southern border-states that lie along the U.S.-Mexico 
border, such as California.18  Early in 2006, a large group of citizens in San 
Bernardino, California, came together and began to rally local support for 
                                                                                                                 
 12.  See Congress’ Fiddling Leaves Cities Fighting Illegal Immigration, USA TODAY, 
Sept. 5, 2006, at 10A [hereinafter Fighting Illegal Immigration], available at http://www. 
usatoday.com/news/opinion/2006-09-04-illegal-immigration-our_x.htm ("While Congress 
dithers on immigration reform, America’s towns and cities are moving to fill the vacuum, 
passing draconian ordinances designed to drive illegal immigrants beyond the city limits.") 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 13. See Pa. Mayor Tells Illegal Immigrants to Go, USA TODAY, July 14, 2009, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-07-13-hazleton-immigrants_x.htm  
(stating that Mayor Louis J. Barletta attributed Hazleton’s problems with violent crime, 
crowded schools, hospitals, and overextended government services to the presence of illegal 
immigrants) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
 14.  Tanner, supra note 2. 
 15. See Ellen Barry, City Vents Anger at Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 
2006, at A1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jul/14/nation/na-hazleton14 
(stating that act passed on July 13, 2006, by a four -to -one vote under the leadership of 
Mayor Louis J. Barletta) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
 16.  See Michael Powell & Michelle García, Pa. City Puts Illegal Immigrants on 
Notice, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2006, at A3 ("I will get rid of the illegal people.  It’s this 
simple:  They must leave." (emphasis in original) (quoting Hazleton Mayor Louis J. 
Barletta));  Pa. Mayor Tells Illegal Immigrants To Go, supra note 13 ("The illegal citizens, I 
would recommend that they leave." (quoting Hazleton Mayor Louis J. Barletta)). 
 17.  See Campbell, supra note 3, at 1041–42 ("While the city of Hazleton, 
Pennsylvania has gained the most notoriety for passing a local immigration restriction 
ordinance, the recent wave started in San Bernardino, California."). 
 18.  See Dorell, supra note 4 (explaining the wave of local action aimed at illegal 
immigration in 2006 began in San Bernardino, California). 
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the "Save San Bernardino Initiative."19  The language used in the 
"Welcome" section on the Initiative’s homepage illustrates the citizens’ 
anti-immigrant sentiment and frustration with the federal government.  It 
states: 
Our state and federal government have been given enough time to stop 
illegal immigration.  It is time that the residents of San Bernardino stand 
up and take matters into their own hands . . . [t]he ‘City of San 
Bernardino Illegal Immigration Relief Act’ will reverse the negative 
impacts of illegal immigration by aggressively and proactively targeting 
policies and entities that aid and abet illegal aliens.20 
This "Save San Bernardino" initiative group tried to pass a local 
ordinance entitled "The Illegal Immigration Relief Act," which would 
have:  (1) stopped taxpayer-funded day laborer centers; (2) seized vehicles 
of those who hire day laborers; (3) punished businesses that aid and abet 
illegal aliens; (4) prohibited renting and leasing to illegal aliens; and (5) 
established an "English-only" policy.21  The ordinance barely lost by a vote 
of four to three.22 
Despite the fact that the proposed anti-immigrant ordinance failed to 
pass in San Bernardino, similar ordinances were still passed in many cities 
across the country, beginning with one in Hazelton, Pennsylvania.23  Like 
the Hazelton ordinance, the ordinances passed by other cities were 
primarily aimed at regulating the employment and housing of illegal 
immigrants, but cities seemed to be attempting to use these regulations to 
                                                                                                                 
 19.  See Save San Bernardino Initiative Homepage, http://www.campaignsite 
builder.com/templates/displayfiles/tmpl68.asp?SiteID=843&PageID=12147&Trial=false 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Save San Bernardino Initiative] (claiming state and 
federal governments have had enough time to stop illegal immigration and it is time for the 
residents of San Bernardino to "take matters into their own hands") (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see also Cindy Chang, 
California City Council Rejects Anti-Immigration Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2006, at 
A21 (stating initiative submitted to the city council by activist Joseph Turner contained 
3,000 signatures). 
 20. Save San Bernardino Initiative, supra note 19. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  See Ashley Powers, Proposal on Migrant Issues Will Go to Voters, L.A. TIMES, 
May 16, 2006, at B1 (reporting council rejected the proposal by a four to three vote after a 
four-hour hearing and debate). 
 23.  See LOCAL ORDINANCES DATABASE, supra note 7 (listing municipalities and 
counties across the United States that have passed ordinances aimed at illegal immigration);  
see also Fighting Illegal Immigration, supra note 12 (stating City of Hazleton used 
ordinance that failed to pass in San Bernardino as a model for Hazleton Ordinance 2006–
16). 
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achieve their ultimate goal of forcing illegal immigrants to leave their 
city.24  This Note now shifts its focus to the primary causes that fueled the 
public’s negative sentiment toward illegal immigrants:  (1) economic 
concerns and (2) anxiety concerning the increase in criminal activity. 
A.  Economic Concerns 
1.  Public Opinion 
One of the two primary causes of the general public’s negative 
sentiment toward illegal immigrants is economic concerns.  There are two 
basic economic concerns that have been expressed by the general public.  
One concern is that illegal immigrants will overburden the public 
government services, having a significantly negative fiscal impact on the 
nation’s economy.25  A Fox News & Opinion Dynamics Poll taken in April 
2006—polling 900 registered voters—found that eighty-seven percent of 
polled registered voters were concerned that illegal immigration 
overburdens government programs and services.26  The second basic 
concern is that illegal immigrants will take away jobs from U.S. citizens.27  
The same poll found that sixty-six percent of respondents were concerned 
that illegal immigration takes jobs away from U.S. citizens.28  Contrary to 
the general public’s opinion, this Note’s analysis of the relevant statistical 
data demonstrates that illegal immigrants actually have a relatively 
insignificant economic impact on the nation. 
                                                                                                                 
 24.  See Dorrell, supra note 4 ("Hazelton’s requirements are strict, but other 
communities are also targeting landlords and employers."); see also Tanner, supra note 2 
("Lawmakers and mayors, they want to make their area as inhospitable to aliens as possible." 
(quoting Susan Wysoki of the Federation for American Immigration Reform)). 
 25.  See Fox News & Opinion Dynamics Poll, April 6, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/ 
projects/pdf/poll_040606.pdf  (last visited Oct. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Fox News Poll]  
(reporting that more individuals polled were concerned illegal immigrants would overburden 
government programs and services than were concerned about other potential impacts of 
illegal immigration, such as changes in culture, increases in crime and terrorism, and 
diversion of jobs away from American citizens) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 26. Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28. Id. 
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2.  Statistical and Fiscal Analysis 
The role played by illegal immigrants in our current economy is 
reflected in statistical data.  Currently, illegal workers constitute 
approximately twenty-four percent of farm workers and hold at least 
fourteen percent of construction jobs.29  Moreover, unauthorized 
immigrants account for roughly five percent of the existing U.S. labor 
force.30  These proportions show no sign of shrinking.31 
The first economic concern to address is the public’s fear that illegal 
immigrants will overburden government programs, resulting in a significant 
negative fiscal impact.  Therefore, exactly what types of economic effects 
are these illegal immigrants having on our country? There is actually no 
compelling evidence to suggest that legal immigration is economically 
preferable to illegal immigration.32  Immigrants have the potential to cause 
both positive and negative fiscal effects on an economy.33  For instance, 
they can generate a positive immigration surplus by raising U.S. 
productivity and making positive net tax contributions.34  However, they 
can also generate a net fiscal burden by paying less in taxes than they 
receive in government benefits.35  Thus, it is possible to make a rough 
calculation of the overall economic impact immigrants have on a country 
by simply netting the positive surplus with the negative burden figures.36  In 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See Ines Ferre et al., Thousands March for Immigrant Rights, CNN, May 1, 2006, 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/05/01/immigrant.day/index.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2010) 
(citing a study conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center in Washington, D.C.) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 30. See GORDON H. HANSON, THE ECONOMIC LOGIC OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS SPECIAL REPORT NO. 26, 24 (2007) [hereinafter HANSON], 
available at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/ImmigrationCSR26.pdf 
(noting that unauthorized immigrants account for five percent of the U.S. labor force). 
 31. See id. at 32 (noting illegal immigration is a "persistent phenomenon"). 
 32.  See id. at 5 (discussing how illegal immigration responds to market forces in ways 
that legal immigration does not). 
 33. See id. at 4–5 (noting that although illegal immigration has obvious flaws, such as 
undermining the rule of law and weakening the ability of the U.S. government to enforce 
labor-market regulations, it also provides American businesses with the types of workers 
they want, when and where they want them). 
 34. See id. at 21 (suggesting that employment-based permanent immigrants and highly 
skilled temporary immigrants "have a positive net impact on the U.S. economy"). 
 35.  See id. (explaining that immigration creates a burden on taxpayers when 
immigrants consume more in government benefits than they pay in taxes). 
 36.  See HANSON, supra note 30, at 21 ("The total impact of immigration on U.S. 
residents—the sum of the immigration surplus (the pretax income gain) and the net fiscal 
transfer from immigrants—would be unambiguously positive."). 
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1996, the National Research Council (NRC) estimated that immigration for 
that year imposed a fiscal burden on the average U.S. native household of 
0.2% of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP).37  For the same year, the 
immigration surplus was estimated at about 0.1% of GDP.38  These 
calculations strongly suggest that in 1996 immigration reduced the annual 
income of U.S. residents by only about 0.1% of GDP.39 
The second economic concern to address is that illegal immigrants will 
take away jobs from U.S. citizens.40  Despite the fact that a relatively large 
percentage of Americans believe this to be true, the statistical data shows 
that the general public is once again misguided in its economic concerns 
over illegal immigration.41  If it were true that illegal immigrants were 
taking away jobs from U.S. citizens, then there would be noticeable 
increases in the U.S. unemployment rate as the flow of illegal immigrants 
increased, and vice versa.42  However, when the relevant unemployment 
and immigration statistics are examined, it appears that there is little to no 
correlation between U.S. unemployment rates and illegal immigration 
rates.43 
It is important to note how minor the negative economic impact 
actually is compared to the relatively large role this topic plays in the 
public’s overall illegal immigration debate.44  Any actual negative 
economic impact illegal immigration is having on this country plays a 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. at 23. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  
 40. See Fox News Poll, supra note 25 (reporting that sixty-six percent of the 900 
registered voters polled were concerned about illegal immigrants taking jobs from citizens). 
 41. Infra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
 42. See THE ECONOMIC BLAME GAME:  U.S. UNEMPLOYMENT IS NOT CAUSED BY 
IMMIGRATION, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER, Nov. 19, 2009, http://www.immigrationpolicy. 
org/just-facts/economic-blame-game-us-unemployment-not-caused-immigration (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2010) (explaining that if immigrants were "taking" the jobs of citizens, then 
unemployment rates of citizens would rise in areas with high numbers of new immigrants; 
yet there is no evidence of increased citizen unemployment in areas with high numbers of 
new immigrants) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
 43. See HANSON, supra note 30, at 16 ("Employment-based permanent immigration 
moves erratically over time, showing no discernible correlation with the U.S. employment 
rate."). 
 44. See id. at 23 ("[W]e cannot say with much conviction whether the aggregate 
impact of immigration on the U.S. economy is positive or negative.  What available 
evidence does suggest is that the total impact is small."). 
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disproportionately large role in shaping the average citizen’s opinions on 
immigration.45 
B.  Public Anxiety over Illegal Immigrants’ Increased Correlation to 
Criminal Activity 
1.  Statistical Data and Public Opinion 
In the past decade, there has been a growing public sentiment that 
illegal immigrants are linked to increases in crime.46  An example of this 
public opinion can be seen on the "Save San Bernardino Initiative" 
homepage, which states:  "Illegal aliens are criminals by definition.  Illegal 
aliens simply bring more crime into our neighborhoods. We are talking 
about an illegal population and subsequent black market economy that must 
be present in order to facilitate and service them."47  A Fox News & 
Opinion Dynamics Poll taken in April 2006—polling 900 registered 
voters—found that seventy-five percent were concerned that illegal 
immigration will lead to an increase in crime.48  In addition, a Time 
magazine national poll taken in January 2006—polling 1,002 adults—found 
that forty percent were "very concerned" that illegal immigrants increase 
crime.49  The public opinion polls show that by 2006, many Americans 
believed that illegal immigrants were responsible for the increase in 
crime.50  An analysis of the statistical data reveals that this public sentiment 
is, in fact, correct.51 
There is a factual link between the increase in illegal immigrants 
coming into this country from the U.S.-Mexico border and the rise in crime 
                                                                                                                 
 45. See id. at 25 ("While the aggregate impacts of both legal and illegal immigration 
are small, the intensity of the public debate about the economic impacts of immigration is 
not a reflection of its aggregate consequences."). 
 46. Infra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
 47. Save San Bernardino Initiative, supra note 19. 
 48. Fox News Poll, supra note 25. 
 49. Mark Schulman & Tara Regan, Poll Analysis, TIME, Mar. 31, 2006, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1179089,00.html (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 50. See Fox News Poll, supra note 25 (finding that seventy-five percent of individuals 
polled were concerned that illegal immigrants would increase crime); see also Schulman & 
Regan, supra note 49 (finding that forty percent of individuals polled were very concerned 
that illegal immigrants increase crime). 
 51. See infra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
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levels.52  In the 1990s, both legal and illegal immigration from Mexico 
surged to unprecedented levels.53  At the same time, there was a significant 
positive correlation with the sharp increase in incidences of violent 
crimes.54  This correlation has been linked to the increase in the extensive 
drug smuggling activity occurring along the U.S.-Mexico border.55  The 
increase in smuggling activity at the southern border of the United States 
can be directly linked to a shift in power of the major drug cartels.56  
According to proceedings from a 1997 meeting of the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims:  "Through other violations of 
our immigration laws, Mexican drug cartels are able to extend their 
command and control into the United States.  Drug smuggling fosters, 
subsidizes, and is dependent upon continued illegal immigration and alien 
smuggling."57  As the power of the Columbian drug cartels crumbled, new 
cartels from Mexico became the major suppliers of illegal narcotics to the 
United States.58  The driving historical forces that led to the current 
structure of power in the illegal drug trade are examined in the next Part, 
which discusses both the background of the drug trade and its newfound 
ties to illegal immigrants. 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See ROBERTO CORONADO & PIA M. ORRENIUS, THE IMPACT OF ILLEGAL 
IMMIGRATION AND ENFORCEMENT ON BORDER CRIME RATES, FED. RES. BANK OF DALLAS,  
RESEARCH DEP’T WORKING PAPER 0303 4 (2003), available at http://dallas 
fedbackup.org/research/papers/2003/wp0303.pdf (finding that the volume of illegal 
immigration has a significant positive correlation with the incidence of violent crime). 
 53. See id. at 11 (noting that "[b]order counties also saw a large share of legal 
immigration from Mexico" during the 1990s). 
 54.  See id. at 16 (finding a "positive and significant correlation between the volume of 
apprehensions of illegal immigrants and the incidence of violent crime"). 
 55.  See id. ("The underlying relationship is likely one in which the reliance of border 
crossers on smugglers, and the pervasiveness of drug smuggling, contribute to violent crime 
along the border."). 
 56.  See Border Security and Deterring Illegal Entry into the United States:  Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th 
Cong. 131 (1997) [hereinafter Border Security Hearing] (statement of Donnie R. Marshall, 
Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Admin.), available at http://commdocs. 
house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju43664.000/hju43664_0.HTM ("Cocaine trafficking in 
the United States is now dominated by organized criminal groups from Mexico who operate 
on both sides of the 2000 mile border that links the U.S. with Mexico.") (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 57.  Id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith, Chairman, Subcomm. on Immigr. and 
Claims). 
 58.  See id. at 131 ("These [Mexican] criminal syndicates are far more sophisticated 
and wealthy than their predecessors, using their wealth to corrupt and intimidate citizens and 
law enforcement officials in Mexico, and to a lesser extent, in the United States, to assist 
them in their criminal enterprises."). 
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2.  Background of the Drug Trade 
In this country, the underground drug trade represents a powerful 
black market in which billions of dollars worth of illegal narcotics are 
bought and sold annually.59  By 1994, it was estimated that the underground 
black market for illegal narcotics accounted for approximately 9.4%—or 
$650 billon—of the total U.S. GDP.60  When the federal government 
undertook its "War on Drugs," the black market for illegal narcotics grew 
rapidly, along with the organized crime rings that dealt in this extremely 
lucrative drug trade.61  This sudden growth in organized crime closely 
mirrors what occurred in this country during the Prohibition Era.62 
After Congress passed the Eighteenth Amendment banning all 
alcoholic beverages,63 an underground black market for alcohol instantly 
came into being.64  From 1920 to 1933, the government’s prohibition of 
alcohol led to a rise in organized crime and widespread trafficking of 
alcohol.65  As a result, the nation’s organized crime syndicates, such as the 
one led by the infamous Al Capone, grew exponentially.66  "At the height of 
the Prohibition, Americans were spending about $5 billion annually on 
alcohol . . . .  This black market constituted about 5 of the U.S. gross 
national product at the time."67  This figure is equivalent to about $79 
                                                                                                                 
 59.  See ERIC SCHLOSSER, REEFER MADNESS:  SEX, DRUGS, AND CHEAP LABOR IN THE 
AMERICAN BLACK MARKET 5 (2003) (finding that the revenue of the illegal drug trade likely 
equals ten percent of the United States’ Gross Domestic Product). 
 60.  Id. at 5. 
 61.  See COCAINE COWBOYS (Magnolia 2007) (illustrating through interviews with 
actual law enforcement officials, journalists, and those who dealt in the drug trade, the rapid 
rise of cocaine and organized crime in Miami in the 1970s and 1980s). 
 62. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 59, at 5 (comparing the drug driven boom in the black 
market to the "thriving underground communities" of Prohibition). 
 63.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933) (prohibiting the manufacture and 
sale of intoxicating liquors). 
 64. See Mark Thorton, Prohibition, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 437 
(Charles Kershaw Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004) (explaining that the strictly 
enforced prohibition of a product eliminates the legal market for that product and creates a 
black market). 
 65.  SCHLOSSER, supra note 59, at 5 (noting the widespread trafficking of alcohol and 
the rise of organized crime following Prohibition). 
 66.  See J. C. Burnham, New Perspectives on the Prohibition "Experiment" of the 
1920s, 2 J. OF SOC. HIST. 51, 62 (1968) ("Because of the large profits involved in bootlegging 
and the inability of producers and consumers to obtain police protection, criminal elements 
organized and exploited the liquor business just as they did all other illegal activities."). 
 67.  SCHLOSSER, supra note 59, at 5. 
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billion in today’s dollars.68  After thirteen years, the government eventually 
realized the futility of trying to enforce the prohibition laws, and, in 1933, 
Congress passed the Twenty-First Amendment, repealing the ban on 
alcohol.69  By repealing the Eighteenth Amendment, the government 
immediately eliminated the black market and the nation saw a 
corresponding decline in the involvement of organized crime in the sale of 
alcohol.70 
In the late 1970s, when the black market for narcotics began to 
expand, the Columbian drug cartel soon became the major supplier of drugs 
for the United States.71  An incredibly high demand for drugs combined 
with the extremely harsh criminal penalties being handed down for drug 
trafficking made selling drugs an extremely lucrative business.72  Up to the 
early 1990s, the Columbian drug cartels controlled the black market for 
narcotics.73  A critical change in the cartel’s leadership led to the powerful 
Columbian cartel’s downfall; however, the strong and reliable demand for 
narcotics remained unchanged.74  As the Columbian cartels declined in 
power, Mexican drug cartels located along the U.S.-Mexico border grew 
quickly to meet the demand.75 
                                                                                                                 
 68.  See U.S. Inflation Calculator, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/ (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2010) (finding rate of inflation change from 1933 to 2010 was 1579.3%) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 69.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI ("The eighteenth article of amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed."). 
 70.  See Nora V. Demleitner, Organized Crime and Prohibition:  What Difference 
Does Legalization Make?, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 613, 626 (1994) (explaining that with the 
end of Prohibition organized crime turned to gambling and prostitution). 
 71.  See Winfred Tate, Colombia’s Role in International Drug Industry, FOREIGN 
POL’Y IN FOCUS (Nov. 1, 1999), available at http://www.fpif.org/reports/ 
colombias_role_in_international_drug_industry (explaining a shift in Colombia’s role in 
drug trafficking from cultivator of marijuana in the early 1970s to a major exporter of 
narcotics in the late 1970s) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
 72.  See id. (stating that drug trafficking in Colombia became a billion dollar industry 
controlled by a few "kingpins"). 
 73.  See JILL SHERMAN, DRUG TRAFFICKING 59 (2010) (explaining that most of the 
cocaine smuggled into the United States through the 1990s came from one of two of 
Colombia’s major drug cartels, the Medellin and the Cali). 
 74.  See id. (explaining that the Colombian police and U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration brought down the Medellin and Cali cartels in the 1990s, causing a 
restructuring in Colombian drug cartels). 
 75.  See Border Security Hearing, supra note 56, at 3 (stating that Mexican drug cartels 
controlled the flow of illegal drugs into the United States). 
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The devastating methamphetamine epidemic that swept across the 
nation in the late 1990s helped to fuel the growth of the Mexican cartels.76  
According to the Drug Enforcement Agency, as of 2005, approximately 
sixty-five percent of all methamphetamine consumed in the United States 
came from Mexican drug cartels.77  By the turn of the century, Mexican 
drug cartels had established themselves as the primary transporters of 
narcotics into the United States.78  The cartels started using illegal 
immigrants to smuggle drugs over the U.S.-Mexico border.79  As the 
Mexican cartels became increasingly more organized and sophisticated, 
their creative methods of drug smuggling followed suit.80  In 2003, U.S. 
authorities discovered elaborate underground tunnels hidden beneath the 
U.S.-Mexico border.81  These tunnels allowed the cartels to funnel 
substantial amounts of drugs into the United States, continuing their use of 
illegal immigrants as "mules" despite increased border security.82  The 
Congressional Research Service even published a report to Congress 
detailing the increased violence in the border area, including kidnapping of 
Americans.83 
                                                                                                                 
 76.  See Steve Suo, Mexican Meth, FRONTLINE, Feb. 14, 2006, http://www. 
pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/meth/etc/updmexico.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2010) 
(describing the growing problem of meth production in Mexico as it becomes more difficult 
to produce in the U.S.) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  See JAMES O. FINCKENAUER, JOSEPH R. FUENTES & GEORGE L. WARD, MEXICO AND 
THE UNITED STATES:  NEIGHBORS CONFRONT DRUG TRAFFICKING, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. 1 
(2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/218561.pdf (explaining that most of 
the narcotics imported into the United States enter through Mexico). 
 79. See David Francis, Mexican Drug Cartels Move into Human Smuggling, SAN 
FRAN. CHRON., Mar. 31, 2008, at A12, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/ 
article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/03/31/MN8MV94C7.DTL (describing the use of mules to move 
drugs across the border) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice).  
 80. See id.  ("U.S. Border Patrol spokesman Special Agent Joe Romero and other law 
enforcement officials say the Mexican drug cartels have even merged human smuggling with 
drug trafficking, forcing immigrants to act as ‘mules’ in transporting drugs as the price of 
passage."). 
 81. See Kevin Bohn, Feds Smoke Out Largest Drug Tunnel Yet, CNN, Jan. 26, 2006, 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/01/26/mexico.tunnel/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2010) (describing 
the discovery of a 1,200 yard tunnel running from Tijuana, Mexico to Otay Mesa, 
California) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 82. See id.  (explaining increase in tunneling is likely a response to increased border 
security after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001). 
 83. See COLLEEN COOK, MEXICO’S DRUG CARTELS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE 11 (2008), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl34215.pdf 
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II.  Discriminatory Local Ordinances 
The following are brief case summaries that pertain to relevant anti-
immigrant ordinances passed in 2006 and thereafter that are arguably 
unconstitutional. 
A.  Primary Examples 
1.  Lozano v. Hazleton84 
The Hazleton case was the first of its kind to bring the issue of 
discriminatory, anti-immigrant legislation to the forefront of legal and 
political debate.85  The social climate in the city of Hazleton, Pennsylvania 
reached a boiling point in the summer of 2006.86  The mayor, along with the 
majority of the city’s legal residents, blamed most of the city’s criminal, 
social, and economic ills on illegal immigrants.87  The mayor pushed 
several anti-immigrant ordinances through city hall.88  Theses ordinances 
were tailored to regulate the employment and housing of illegal 
immigrants,89 however, it appeared that their true intent was to drive illegal 
immigrants out of the city.90  Shortly after the Hazelton ordinance was 
                                                                                                                 
(describing increased border violence and increasingly brutal tactics used by Mexican drug 
cartels). 
 84. See Lozano v. Hazleton, 459 F. Supp. 2d. 332, 338 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (granting 
temporary restraining order on a city ordinance that would cause eviction of a number of 
apartment dwellers because of the irreparable harm that would occur if the ordinance took 
effect). 
 85. See Linda Kaiser Conley & Ilan Rosenberg, The Eye of the Storm, PA. LAW. 36 
(2007) (stating that the city’s ordinances were the first of their kind in the nation). 
 86. See Campbell, supra note 3, at 1042–44 (outlining the legislation passed in 
Hazelton in 2006, and its subsequent effects on the community). 
 87. See Tanner, supra note 2 ("In defending the ordinance, the mayor of Hazleton, 
Louis Barletta, stated, ‘Illegal immigrants are destroying the city.  I don’t want them here, 
period.’"). 
 88. See Conley & Rosenberg, supra note 85, at 35 (describing the Mayor’s push to 
pass the city ordinances). 
 89. See id. ("In the summer of 2006, blaming many of the city’s criminal, economic 
and social ills on ‘illegal aliens,’ Hazleton’s mayor pushed through city council several 
ordinances designed to regulate the housing and employment of those viewed as unlawfully 
present in the United States."). 
 90. See Campbell, supra note 3, at 1044 (discussing the targeting and harassment of 
Latinos under suspicion of violating the ordinances, and the exodus of illegal immigrants 
from the city after the ordinances were passed). 
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passed in the summer of 2006, the nation saw a subsequent flurry of 
litigation related to anti-immigrant ordinances that had been passed all over 
the country.91  Those ordinances are addressed below. 
2.  Riverside Coalition v. Riverside92 
In October 2006, the ACLU filed suit against the city of Riverside, 
New Jersey in the Superior Court of New Jersey, alleging that the city’s 
proposed anti-immigrant ordinance was unconstitutional.93  The ordinance 
called for fines of up to two thousand dollars to be levied against anyone 
who knowingly hired or rented to illegal immigrants.94  Additionally, the 
ordinance contained a provision allowing the city to revoke business 
permits for up to five years if employers knowingly hire illegal 
immigrants.95 
3.  Garrett v. Escondido96 
In early November 2006, various civil rights groups in the City of 
Escondido, California formed a coalition and filed a complaint against the 
city on behalf of landlords, tenants, and community groups.97  A local 
ordinance recently passed made it illegal to rent property to illegal aliens in 
the City of Escondido.98  The coalition challenged the ordinance as 
unconstitutional for three reasons.  First, they contended that the ordinance 
                                                                                                                 
 91. See Conley & Rosenberg, supra note 85, at 36 (discussing the wave of similar 
ordinances passed nationally after Hazleton passed its anti-immigrant ordinances); see also 
discussion infra Parts II.A.2–5 (outlining the cases that arose as a result of these ordinances). 
 92. See Complaint, Riverside Coal. v. Riverside, No. 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. Oct. 18, 2006), available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/ 
public/IM-NJ-0001-0001.pdf (describing the grounds upon which the ACLU filed a 
complaint against the city of Riverside). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Riverside Twp., NJ, Ordinance No. 2006-26 (amended Oct. 25, 2006), available 
at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-NJ-0001-0005.pdf. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Garrett v. Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1060 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (granting a 
temporary restraining order on the city ordinance and finding that it would cause irreparable 
harm to the affected illegal immigrants and the city’s interest in enforcing the ordinance did 
not outweigh this harm). 
 97. Id. at 1047. 
 98. Id. at 1048. 
654 16 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. SOC. JUST. 639 (2010) 
directly violated federal immigration laws and that the federal government 
has exclusive jurisdiction to create and enforce immigration laws.99  
Second, they alleged that the ordinance violated the contract rights of the 
landlords and tenants.100  Finally, the coalition argued that the city’s 
ordinance violated federal fair housing laws and, therefore, violated the Due 
Process Clause.101 
4.  Reynolds v. Valley Park102 
In the summer of 2006, the city council of Valley Park, Missouri voted 
to pass Ordinance No. 1708.103  This particular ordinance made it illegal to 
hire or attempt to hire any illegal aliens or rent property to such persons.104  
The ordinance also contained an "English Only" provision.105 
                                                                                                                 
 99. See id. at 1055–56 (explaining plaintiff’s argument that the ordinance violates the 
Supremacy Clause as "an impermissible attempt to regulate immigration," under the concept 
of field preemption by the federal government, and that "the [o]rdinance conflicts with 
individual provisions of Federal law"). 
 100. See id. at 1051–52 ("Plaintiffs further contend that the Ordinance forces landlords 
to . . . choose between violation of the Ordinance or breaching valid contracts such that it 
requires them to ‘engage in policing actions or impaling their existing contractual 
obligations.’"). 
 101. See Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 ("Plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance 
‘facially deprives Plaintiffs of due process’ because it ‘fails to provide either landlords or 
tenants with any notice or opportunity to be heard before depriving them of fundamental 
liberty and property rights.’").  
 102. See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, No. 4:06-
CV-01487 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 25, 2006), available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/ 
chDocs/public/IM-MO-0001-0005.pdf (upholding permanent restraining order on the 
enforcement provisions of two city ordinances that adversely affected illegal immigrants), 
aff’d, 254 S.W.3d 264, 266–67 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (dismissing the appeal seeking to have 
ordinances declared void and unenforceable, as the city had repealed them and enacted new 
ordinances). 
 103. Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance No. 1715 (Sept. 26, 2006), available at 
http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-MO-0001-0009.pdf. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Campbell, supra note 3, at 1054 (explaining that "English Only" laws prevent 
those who cannot communicate in English or who would better communicate in another 
language from speaking in that language by making English the official language). 
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5.  Vasquez v. Farmer’s Branch106 
On November 13, 2006, the city of Farmer’s Branch, Texas, passed 
Ordinance No. 2892.107  This ordinance required proof of citizenship or 
residency in order to rent from a landlord.108 
B.  Potential Unconstitutionality of Local Ordinances 
As more local governments began passing anti-immigrant ordinances, 
civil rights groups and other like-minded legal factions began a collective 
rally to challenge their constitutionality.109  As of the date of writing this 
Note, the constitutionality of these ordinances had not been addressed by 
the Supreme Court.110  But the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to 
grant certiorari to Hazleton as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit issued its opinion finding the ordinance to be unconstitutional.111  
                                                                                                                 
 106. See Vasquez v. Farmers Branch, No. 3-07CV0061 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2007), 
available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=5539 (challenging an ordinance 
which would have required landlords to check tenants’ U.S. Citizenship or eligible 
immigration status before renting to them) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 107. See Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2892 (Nov. 13, 2006), available at  
http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-TX-0001-0002.pdf (outlining the 
requirement that landlords verify the U.S. citizenship or eligible immigration status before 
renting to tenants). 
 108. See id. ("The owner and/or property manager shall require as a prerequisite to 
entering into any lease or rental arrangement, including any lease or rental renewals or 
extensions, the submission of evidence of citizenship or eligible immigration status for each 
tenant family . . . ."). 
 109. See, Anti-Immigrant Ordinances:  Farmers Branch, Texas, American Civil 
Liberties Union, January 5, 2007, http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/discrim/27859res 
20070105.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) (listing some of the organizations challenging 
the Farmer’s Branch ordinance, such as the Mexican American Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund and the ACLU of Texas) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 110. See Conley & Rosenberg, supra note 85, at 40 ("The Hazleton decision, however, 
will not bring a final conclusion to the issues raised in the immigration debate by local 
municipalities. Hazleton has appealed to the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, and its 
mayor has promised a further appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court . . . ."). 
 111. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No. 07-3531, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18835, at 
*138, *153 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2010) (finding that Hazleton’s ordinances regulating 
employment of undocumented immigrants and provision of housing to undocumented 
immigrants were preempted by the Federal Immigration Reform and Control Act).   
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The city’s mayor has already promised to appeal to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.112 
The constitutional infirmities of these local ordinances can be 
separated into two distinct groups.  Ordinances that fall into the first group 
violate the concept of preemption set forth in the Supremacy Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution.113  If it is determined that a local ordinance is preempted 
by federal law, these ordinances are almost always unconstitutional.114  
Ordinances that fall into the second group present more complex questions 
of constitutionality. 
1.  Preemption and the Supremacy Clause 
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution establishes that the 
Constitution, federal statutes, and U.S. treaties are to be treated as "the 
supreme law of the land."115  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the 
regulation of immigration "is unquestionably exclusively a federal 
power."116  The Supreme Court has ruled that state or local law attempting 
to regulate immigration will be invalid if:  (1) Congress shows any intent to 
occupy a given field of law; (2) the state law conflicts with federal law, 
meaning, it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law; or (3) 
the state law acts as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress.117  Since immigration law is under the almost 
exclusive control of the Federal Government, the recent attempts of local 
governments to regulate illegal immigrants by enacting and enforcing local 
immigration ordinances exceeds the power delegated to municipal 
governments.118 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See Larry King, Federal Appeals Court Strikes Down Hazleton’s Immigration 
Ordinances, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, September 10, 2010, at B1 ("Saying he was ‘not 
disillusioned’ by the ruling, Barletta pledged to take the case to the Supreme Court."). 
 113. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (holding that immigration laws fall 
within the purview of the federal government and will preempt conflicting state laws). 
 114. See discussion infra Part II.B.1 (describing this first category of ordinances and the 
likelihood that they will be preempted by federal law, thus rendering them unconstitutional). 
 115. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 116. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354. 
 117. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (stating the grounds 
on which preemption can occur); see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. 
Conserv. & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203–04 (1983) (discussing the test used to 
determine if federal law preempts state law). 
 118. See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354 (stating that the U.S. Constitution gives the federal 
government exclusive control over immigration matters). 
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In 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 
which restricts immigration into the United States.119   Because the INA 
governs the substantive area of law that local anti-immigrant ordinances 
attempt to regulate,120 these local ordinances are preempted by the 
Supremacy Clause.121  As a result, any local ordinance which attempts to 
regulate illegal immigration will most likely be preempted by federal law 
and subsequently struck down as unconstitutional.122 
2.  Other Potential Constitutional Infirmities 
The local anti-immigrant ordinances are arguably unconstitutional for 
four other reasons:  they violate the First Amendment, the Contract Clause, 
the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause.  Unlike a 
challenge under the Supremacy Clause, a challenge for one of these four 
reasons requires the court to decide the threshold question:  Whether illegal 
immigrants targeted by an ordinance are entitled to enjoy the rights of U.S. 
citizens granted in the U.S. Constitution?123  The Supreme Court’s current 
jurisprudence does not definitively answer this question.124   As a result, this 
Note argues that the arguments for an ordinance’s unconstitutionality for 
these reasons are weaker. 
In 1982, the Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe,125 asserted that illegal 
immigrants did have the constitutional rights of Due Process and Equal 
Protection.126  However, in 1990, the Supreme Court clarified and 
                                                                                                                 
 119. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et. seq. (Lexis 2010). 
 120. See id. section 1324a (stating that INA § 274A expressly preempts any state or 
local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions upon those who employ, or attempt to employ, 
illegal aliens). 
 121.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring that the Constitution is the "[S]upreme 
Law of the Land[, the] . . . Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding"). 
 122. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (stating that Federal law preempts 
most state and local immigration laws, with a narrow exception for tangential matters). 
 123. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (striking down a Texas statute 
prohibiting illegal alien children from receiving an education in public schools).  The case 
also addresses whether illegal immigrants are afforded Constitutional protections under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
 124. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (reviewing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
the issue of illegal immigrants’ entitlement to constitutional rights). 
 125. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210 ("Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is 
unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments."). 
 126. See id. at 211–12 (stating that illegal immigrants are "within the jurisdiction" of 
the states in which they reside and, therefore, receive Fourteenth Amendment protections, 
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weakened Plyler.  In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,127 the Supreme 
Court stated:  "[T]hose cases in which aliens have been determined to enjoy 
certain constitutional rights establish only that aliens receive such 
protections when they have come within the territory of, and have 
developed substantial connections with, this country."128  The Supreme 
Court reiterated the finding of Chew v. Colding:129  "The Bill of Rights is a 
futile authority for the alien seeking admission for the first time to these 
shores.  But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he 
becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all 
people within our borders."130  With United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,131 
standing as the Supreme Court’s most recent ruling on this issue, it is 
questionable whether the illegal immigrants targeted by the local 
ordinances are entitled to each of the four constitutional rights at issue.  The 
determination is likely to hinge on whether said illegal immigrants have 
"developed substantial connections with, this country."132 
a.  First Amendment Violations 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right to 
free speech.133  Most of these anti-immigrant ordinances, such as those seen 
in the Hazelton and Reynolds cases, contain some form of an "English 
                                                                                                                 
and finding that a class of persons receiving protection from the equal protection guarantee 
is also entitled due process protections). 
 127. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273–75 (1990) 
(establishing a threshold for when illegal aliens are afforded Constitutional rights).  The 
Court refused to grant Fourth Amendment rights to a citizen and resident of Mexico, when 
the location searched was in Mexico. 
 128. Id. at 260.  
 129. See Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 603 (1953) (holding that the Attorney General 
could not deny an illegal alien the opportunity to be heard in opposition to a permanent 
deportation order). 
 130. See id. at 596 n.5 (Murphy, J., concurring) (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 
135, 161 (1945)).  
 131. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275 (holding that the Fourth Amendment does 
not apply to the search and seizure by United States agents of property owned by a 
nonresident alien and located in a foreign country). 
 132. Id. at 260.  
 133. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances."). 
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Only" provision.134  The San Bernardino Initiative’s proposed ordinance, 
entitled the "Illegal Immigration Relief Act," also contained an "English 
Only" provision.135  In fact, the text found in San Bernardino’s proposed 
ordinance is a good example of a typical "English Only" provision.  It 
states:  "Unless explicitly mandated by the federal government, the state of 
California or the county of San Bernardino, all official city business, forms, 
documents, signage, telecommunication or electronic communication 
devices will be conducted or written in or utilize English only."136 
These "English Only" provisions found in the majority of the anti-
immigrant ordinances violate the First Amendment’s free speech rights of 
those immigrants who cannot speak or write in English.137  Formally 
banning other languages from being recognized as acceptable means of 
communicating public business effectively strips all non-English speakers 
of the ability to express themselves in public forums.138  In Meyer v. 
Nebraska,139 the U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak 
other languages as well as to those born with English on the tongue.  
Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready understanding 
of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which 
                                                                                                                 
 134. See, e.g., Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2892 (Nov. 13, 2006), available at  
http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-TX-0001-0002.pdf ("The English 
language is hereby declared the Official Language of the City of Farmers Branch, 
Texas."); see also Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance 1708 (July 17, 2006), available at 
http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-MO-0001-0009.pdf ("The City of 
Valley Park declares that English is the official language of the City."), and Hazelton, 
Pa., Ordinance 2006-19 (Oct. 11, 2006), available at http://www.clearinghouse. 
wustl.edu/chdocs/public/IM-PA-0001-0007.pdf ("The English language is the official 
language of the City of Hazleton."). 
 135. See Save San Bernardino Initiative Text, http://www.campaignsitebuilder.com/ 
templates/displayfiles/tmpl68.asp?SiteID=843&PageID=12139&Trial=false (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2010) (providing an example of an English only ordinance) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  
 136. Id. 
 137. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (holding a statute 
unconstitutional that prevented the teaching of modern foreign language to children, and 
stating that such a statute could not be for the mental health of children). 
 138. See Campbell, supra note 3, at 1054–56 (discussing the consequences of "English-
only" laws). 
 139. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403 (holding a statute unconstitutional that prevented the 
teaching of modern foreign language to children, and stating that such a statute could not be 
for the mental health of children). 
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conflict with the Constitution—a desirable end cannot be promoted by 
prohibited means.140 
The majority of the previously mentioned local ordinances had 
"English Only" clauses written into them; therefore, these ordinances would 
be unconstitutional if they targeted illegal immigrants who are entitled to 
the constitutional rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.141 
b.  Contract Clause 
The Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution guarantees people the 
right to make and enforce private contracts without governmental 
interference.142  The Supreme Court’s current test of what constitutes a 
violation of an individual’s constitutional right to contract was presented in 
Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light.143  In Energy Reserves 
Group, the Supreme Court set out a three-part test to determine whether a 
local or state law violates the Contract Clause. 144  First, the test states that 
the regulation must substantially impair a contractual relationship.145  
Second, the State must show there was a "significant and legitimate 
purpose" behind the regulation, such as attempting to remedy a broad and 
general social or economic problem.146  Third, the test states that the 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. 
 141. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (outlining the right to free exercise of religion, freedom 
of speech, and assembly).  
 142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  The Contract Clause states: 
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but 
gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, 
ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any 
Title of Nobility. 
Id. 
 143. See Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411–13 
(1983) (holding that the Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act was not in violation of the 
plaintiff’s contract clause rights because plaintiff’s ability to contract was not impaired). 
 144. See id. at 411–13 (utilizing a three-part test to establish whether a Kansas law 
violated the plaintiff’s rights under the Contract Clause of the Constitution).  
 145. See id. at 411 ("The threshold inquiry is ‘whether the state law has, in fact, 
operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.’" (quoting Allied 
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978)).  
 146. See id. at 411–12. ("If the state regulation constitutes a substantial impairment, the 
State, in justification, must have a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the 
regulation . . . ."). 
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proposed law must be reasonable and appropriate for its intended 
purpose.147 
The above test is the standard that should apply whenever an 
individual alleges that his right to contract has been unconstitutionally 
violated.  In Garrett v. Escondido,148 attorneys for various civil rights 
groups filed a complaint against the City of Escondido, alleging that it 
violated the contract rights of landlords and tenants when it passed its local 
ordinance because the ordinance made it illegal to rent property to illegal 
aliens. 149  On December 11, 2006, Judge John Houston of the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of California agreed and held that 
the ordinance did unconstitutionally violate the Contract Clause.150  Judge 
Houston placed a permanent injunction barring the City of Escondido from 
enforcing its ordinance in perpetuity.151  Although this decision indicates 
that making it illegal to rent property to illegal immigrants is a violation of 
constitutionally protected contract rights, there is currently no Supreme 
Court jurisprudence that addresses this issue.  As a result, a 
disproportionately small number of plaintiffs who have challenged these 
ordinances have argued that the Contract Clause was violated.152  The other 
potential constitutional infirmities discussed in this Note have more guiding 
Supreme Court precedent. 
c.  Equal Protection Clause 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
states:  "Nor shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws."153  If a U.S. law denies a right to some 
                                                                                                                 
 147. See id. at 412 ("[T]he next inquiry is whether the adjustment of ‘the rights and 
responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon reasonable conditions and [is] of a 
character appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the legislation’s] adoption.’" (quoting 
U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)). 
 148. Garrett v. Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (S.D. Cal. 2006). 
 149. See Garrett, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (granting a restraining order against an 
ordinance that sanctioned landlords who rented to illegal immigrants).  
 150. See id. at 1057 ("Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that 
Plaintiffs have raised serious concerns regarding the constitutionality of the Ordinance and 
its preemption by federal law.").  
 151. Id. 
 152. See supra Part II (discussing the cases that have challenged the Hazleton and City 
of Farmer’s Ordinances).  
 153. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.   
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citizens but not all, it can be challenged under the Equal Protection 
Clause.154  Furthermore, existing Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that 
the Equal Protection Clause extends not only to U.S. citizens, but to every 
person living within its borders, including aliens.155  In Torao Takahashi v. 
Fish and Game Commission,156 the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects "all persons" against state legislation.157   The Court 
went on to state:  "The Fourteenth Amendment and the laws adopted under 
its authority thus embody a general policy that all persons lawfully in this 
country shall abide ‘in any state’ on an equality of legal privileges with all 
citizens under non-discriminatory laws."158 
More recent Supreme Court holdings, which analyze the Civil Rights 
Act, have narrowed the focus of the Equal Protection Clause’s applicability 
to the anti-immigrant ordinances.159   Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 states:  "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance."160  The Supreme Court has held that 
intentional discrimination on the part of any entity that receives federal 
funds and violates the Equal Protection Clause also violates Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act.161  Because all U.S. cities receive some type of federal 
funding,162 they are in violation of Title VI if they enact "English Only" 
                                                                                                                 
 154. See id. ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States.").  
 155. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) ("The Federal 
Government has broad constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to 
the United States, the period they may remain, regulation of their conduct before 
naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization.").  
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 420. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See generally Jason H. Lee, Unlawful Status as a Constitutional Irrelevancy?:  
The Equal Protection Rights of Illegal Immigrants, 39 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 1 (2008) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection decisions and the Plyler decision).  
 160. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). 
 161. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732–33 (1992) (analyzing a state 
system for dual university admissions for blacks and whites that is federally funded and in 
violation of both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act).    
 162. See STATE-BY-STATE FACT SHEETS, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget_factsheets_states/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2010) 
(detailing the distribution of federal funding in U.S. cities and states) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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ordinances and deny municipal services, such as public education, to non-
English speaking individuals.163 
d.  Due Process Clause 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution contains the Due 
Process Clause, which reads:  "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."164  Many of the 
local anti-immigrant ordinances potentially violate the Due Process 
Clause.165  For example, nearly all of these ordinances impose some type of 
civil or criminal penalty upon an employer for hiring, or attempting to hire, 
an illegal immigrant.166  Imposing such penalties automatically upon 
employers without giving them an opportunity to defend themselves 
presents a potential Due Process violation.167  Other potential Due Process 
Clause violations exist because the language of the ordinance is vague.168  
For instance, the Hazelton Ordinance states: 
An employer is guilty of aiding and abetting an illegal immigrant if they 
[sic] are found to have engaged in funding, providing goods and services 
to or aiding in the establishment or continuation of any day labor center 
or other entity providing similar services, unless the entity acts with due 
diligence to verify the legal work status of all persons whom it 
employs169   
                                                                                                                 
 163. See Campbell, supra note 3, at 1055–56 ("Such provisions . . . unconstitutionally 
infringe upon the rights of non-English speakers or those with limited-English 
proficiency."). 
 164. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 165. See Campbell, supra note 3, at 1049–50 (depicting how stringent sanctions could 
have the effect of Due Process violations). 
 166. See e.g., S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (requiring officials of 
the state, counties, cities and towns of Arizona to fully comply with and assist in the 
enforcement of federal immigration laws and making the presence of an illegal alien on 
public and private lands a trespassing offense). 
 167. See Campbell, supra note 3, at 1049–50 (depicting how stringent sanctions could 
have the effect of Due Process violations). 
 168. See id. at 1055 (illustrating how "English Only" ordinances may be vague and 
unclear to non-English speaking individuals).  
 169. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-16 (Oct. 11, 2006), available at http://www. 
clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chdocs/public/IM-PA- 0001-0007.pdf. 
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Because the ordinance does not give an exact definition of what 
constitutes "due diligence," the entire ordinance is arguably vague, which 
potentially violates the employer’s right to due process.170 
A final example of a due process violation present in many local 
ordinances is in Bright Lights, Inc. v. City of Newport;171 the court held that 
the plaintiff’s right to due process was violated when the city denied her the 
opportunity to defend herself by demonstrating she did not have actual or 
constructive knowledge of the illegal acts of her employees.172 
III.  Future Jurisprudence 
The Hazelton Ordinance was the first to be challenged in federal 
court.173  However, the Hazelton decision and those that followed it have 
not yet resolved the constitutional issues.174  And the Supreme Court has yet 
to render its opinion.175  But the day for the Supreme Court to speak might 
be rapidly approaching.176 
The Supreme Court could hold that these anti-immigrant local 
ordinances are unconstitutional attempts to regulate illegal immigration to 
some degree; therefore, they are preempted by federal law and should be 
struck down as unconstitutional.177  Whether the Supreme Court could find 
                                                                                                                 
 170. See Campbell, supra note 3, at 1047 (showing the effect of the vagueness of an 
ordinance in employment due process situations). 
 171. See Bright Lights, Inc. v. City of Newport, 830 F. Supp. 378, 385 (F.D. Ky. 1993) 
(stating that a challenged enactment need not deprive a citizen of his physical liberty to 
offend due process; it is enough that it seeks to deprive him of property interest, such as a 
license). 
 172. Id. at 387 ("Thus, a statute must delineate any prohibited conduct ‘with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner 
that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’") (quoting Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 552, 357–358 (1983)). 
 173. See Conley & Rosenberg, supra note 85, at 39–40 (discussing the procedural 
posture of the Hazleton case). 
 174. See id. at 40 ("The Hazleton decision, however, will not bring a final conclusion to 
the issues raised in the immigration debate by local municipalities."). 
 175. See King, supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 176. See King, supra note 112 and accompanying text; see also Lozano v. City of 
Hazleton, No. 07-3531, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18835, at *138, *153 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2010) 
(finding that Hazleton’s ordinances regulating employment of undocumented immigrants 
and provision of housing to undocumented immigrants were preempted by the Federal 
Immigration Reform and Control Act). 
 177. See Campbell, supra note 3, at 1058–60 (detailing the various ordinances and 
regulations occurring across the United States in response to the presence of illegal 
immigrants); see also Conley & Rosenberg, supra note 85, at 34–35 (discussing the 
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that the ordinances are unconstitutional because they deny constitutional 
rights to illegal immigrants is more difficult to predict.178  As noted earlier, 
the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence regarding whether illegal 
immigrants are entitled to constitutional rights is still ambiguous.179  The 
determining factor appears to be whether or not the illegal immigrant in 
question has developed substantial connections with this country.180  As a 
result, it is likely that geography will play an important factor in 
determining whether or not illegal immigrants residing in a particular area 
are entitled to the benefits and protections of the four constitutional rights 
discussed in this Note.181  Illegal immigrants living deeper inside the United 
States may be more likely to be viewed as having developed a substantial 
connection with this country than those living in the border states.182   In 
addition, only two of the four potential constitutional rights, the Due 
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, were specifically 
mentioned by the Court in the Verdugo-Urquidez case.183   This indicates 
that, in the future, the Court may be more likely to find that a given set of 
illegal immigrants is entitled to enjoy those two constitutional rights, to the 
exclusion of the others. 
The holding of a lower court on the issue of whether illegal 
immigrants are entitled to constitutional rights is notable.  In July 2007, 
U.S. District Court Judge James Munley ruled against the city of Hazelton, 
finding that the Hazelton Ordinance was preempted by federal law and 
violated the plaintiffs’ due process rights.184  Obviously, lower court 
                                                                                                                 
immigration ordinance in the Hazleton case).  
 178. See supra Part II.B.2.c (describing the ambiguity present in illegal immigration 
regulation and administration, particularly concerning ordinances). 
 179. Id. 
 180. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 260 (1990) ("This suggests 
that ‘the people’ refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who 
have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of 
that community."). 
 181. See supra Part I (describing in detail the four constitutional rights discussed in this 
Note). 
 182. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271 (discussing the effect of the substantial 
connection test). 
 183. See generally id. (discussing the due process and equal protection constitutional 
protections in relation to illegal immigrants). 
 184. See Lozano v. Hazleton, 459 F. Supp. 2d 332, 336 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (granting a 
temporary restraining order in an action challenging constitutionality of two city 
immigration ordinances); see also Judge Voids Pa. City’s Illegal Immigration Law, MSNBC 
NEWS, July 26, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19978003/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2010) 
(discussing the effect of the Hazleton decision nationwide) (on file with the Washington and 
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judgments are no guarantee for predicting the Supreme Court’s future 
jurisprudence, but they can be helpful in calculating an educated guess 
about the future. 
IV.  Alternative Solutions 
As this Note suggests, the vast majority of local anti-immigrant 
ordinances are unconstitutional on many levels.185  It is entirely possible 
that the Supreme Court will take on this issue and hold that they are 
unconstitutional.  Therefore, these local ordinances are obviously not a 
viable permanent solution that will fix cities’ perceived illegal immigration 
problems.  This Note argues a feasible long-term solution can be created 
with a two-pronged approach that entails:  (1) drafting new federal 
legislation and (2) re-evaluating the current federal budget allocations being 
spent to enforce the nation’s drug laws. 
A.  New Federal Legislation 
The Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act 
(CLEAR Act) was a bill proposed in 2005.186  The goal of the bill is to 
provide for enhanced federal, state, and local assistance in the enforcement 
of the immigration laws.187  The CLEAR Act intended to improve upon 
existing immigration agencies, such as the Department of Homeland 
Security and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), in 
order to more effectively address the current illegal immigration issues.188  
Theoretically, once it was passed, local governments would no longer feel 
the need to pass local anti-immigrant ordinances.189  This bill never became 
law; it was merely referred to the House of Representatives, but did not go 
                                                                                                                 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  
 185. See supra Part II.B (discussing the unconstitutionality of local anti-immigrant 
ordinances).  
 186. See Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act, H.R. 3137, 109th 
Cong. (2005) (providing for federal, state, and local assistance in the enforcement of the 
immigration laws, and amending the Immigration and Nationality Act to authorize 
appropriations to carry out the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program, and for other 
purposes). 
 187. See id. at preamble (describing the purpose of the CLEAR Act).  
 188. See id. § 2 (discussing the purpose of the CLEAR Act in more detail).  
 189. Id. § 3.  
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further.190  Reinforcing existing immigration agencies could take pressure 
off of local and state governments to pass anti-immigrant legislation and 
could be part of a permanent solution.191  Congress should continue to 
pursue this bill or one similar to the CLEAR Act. 
B.  Federal Budget Allocations Spent on Enforcing Drug Laws 
In addition to reinforcing federal immigration agencies, the 
government should also re-evaluate the money currently allocated to 
enforcing the nation’s drug laws.  By amending the nation’s current drug 
laws and budget allocation policies, the government could become more 
effective in curtailing the supply side of the narcotics black market.  As this 
Note already mentioned, there is a correlation between the increase in the 
flow of illegal immigrants entering the country at the U.S.-Mexico border 
and the increase in crime rates.192  Furthermore, many illegal immigrants 
aid the Mexican drug cartels by trafficking drugs into the United States.193 
The United States’ recent meth epidemic has only fueled the growth of the 
Mexican cartels.194 
Currently, the U.S. government allocates a significant amount of 
funding for the purpose of enforcing ineffective drug laws.195  In 2008, the 
government’s annual budget for enforcing drug laws was approximately 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act, H.R. 3137, 109th Cong. 
(2005), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-3137 (tracking the 
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Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 191. See JESSICA M. VAUGHAN & JON D. FEERE, TAKING BACK THE STREETS:  ICE AND 
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TARGET IMMIGRANT GANGS 1 (2008), available at 
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across the United States–Mexico border).  
 194. See Steve Suo, Mexican Meth, FRONTLINE, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/meth/etc/updmexico.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2010) (describing the growing 
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$14.1 billion.196  Each year, a large portion of that annual budget is spent 
enforcing the current drug laws within our own borders.197  In the last two 
decades, over ten million American citizens have been arrested for 
marijuana offenses.198  Approximately a quarter of a million of those who 
faced criminal charges for marijuana possession were convicted of a felony 
and sentenced to prison for at least one year.199  In 1970, before our 
government started its War on Drugs, there were 3,384 marijuana drug 
offenders serving time in federal prison.200  Today, that number has 
increased to over 68,000.201  Many of these inmates are first-time offenders 
with no prior criminal record.202 
As alarming as those statistics are, they are only the tip of the iceberg.  
A recent statistical analysis of the criminal justice system showed that 
approximately one in 100 American citizens are currently incarcerated.203  
This means that the United States currently has more people in prison than 
any other country.204  On average, about twenty percent of all inmates in 
America are serving time for drug related charges.205  Our nation’s current 
drug laws have the government spending billions and billions of dollars 
each year arresting, prosecuting, and incarcerating our nation’s citizens for 
minor drug offenses.206 
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The past three decades have shown that this strategy is simply not 
effective.207  Instead, our government should focus on shutting down the 
Mexican cartels that are currently supplying the majority of the drugs to the 
United States.  By decriminalizing marijuana, reducing the criminal 
penalties for simple possession offenses, and repealing the federal 
mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines for drug offenses, the black 
market for drugs will naturally shrink on its own.208  This allows for a 
smaller allocation of government funds to be spent enforcing drug laws 
within our borders.209  The money that is left over could be spent on 
shutting down the supply side of the black market—the Mexican cartels. 
By amending the nation’s drug laws to allow the government to be 
more effective in curtailing the Mexican cartels that are the main suppliers 
of drugs to the United States, the government could then lower crime rates 
by reducing drug smuggling activities along the nation’s southern border 
with Mexico.  Reducing crime rates would, in turn, reduce the public’s 
overall perception that illegal immigrants are responsible for the criminal 
activities in their cities.  This would reduce the political pressure the public 
is exerting on its local governments to pass anti-immigrant ordinances. 
V.  Conclusion 
In conclusion, the recent anti-immigrant ordinances that were passed 
in many cities across the country are a product of the public’s growing 
negative sentiment toward illegal immigrants.210  This negative sentiment 
primarily originates from two main public concerns:  (1) economic 
concerns and (2) concerns that illegal immigrants are causing increased 
levels of criminal activity.211  Many of the public’s economic concerns are 
                                                                                                                 
arresting drug offenders).  
 207. See id. (discussing the ineffectiveness of some American drug policies).  
 208. See generally David A. Boyum & Mark A.R. Kleiman, Substance Abuse from a 
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misguided, while in the alternative, its concerns regarding increased 
criminal activity associated with illegal immigrants are valid.212  For 
example, following the rise of the Mexican drug cartels in the 1990s, illegal 
immigrants have increasingly participated in the drug trade and its 
associated criminal activities.213  A constitutional analysis of the current 
local anti-immigrant ordinances reveals that they are likely to be found 
unconstitutional on several levels.214  A permanent solution should be 
designed to remedy the cause of the public’s negative sentiment toward 
illegal immigrants.  By improving the public’s overall negative attitude 
toward illegal immigrants, the U.S. government can reduce the pressure 
currently being exerted by citizens on local city councils to pass anti-
immigrant ordinances that are not only discriminatory but also 
unconstitutional. 
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